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The Ontogenetic Fallacy: The Immanent Critique of Habermas’s 





Since the emergence of neo-evolutionism in the 1960s, various critiques of the theory 
of social or socio-cultural evolution have been forwarded, including notably those of 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Alain Touraine and Anthony Giddens who decisively reject 
the idea of evolution. Within this context, Jürgen Habermas's theory of socio-cultural 
evolution has also become a specific object of critique, the best known in the English-
speaking world being, perhaps, Michael Schmid's critique (1982). While the latter is 
ultimately based on neo-Darwinistic assumptions (1982a, 1987) which allow a non-
Marxist alternative to be pitted against Habermas's position, a significant immanent 
critique has been taking shape during the late 1970s and 1980s the contours of which 
are at present starting to become visible, despite the fact that as yet it is nowhere 
developed and presented in a systematic manner. I have in mind here the work of 
younger authors belonging to the circle around Habermas, such as Johann Arnason, 
Axel Honneth, Hans Joas, Günter Frankenberg, Ulrich Rödel, and Klaus Eder, who 
have not only developed a critique of Habermas but are also engaged in developing 
an alternative to him within the framework of critical theory. 
       
In this essay I propose to present an overview of this immanent (i.e. critical 
theoretical) critique of Habermas's theory of socio-cultural evolution from the point 
of view of the basic theoretical problem that, in my opinion, is at issue in it. Allow me 
to briefly clarify this point of view.       
 
In the light of debates in both theoretical biology and social theory during the last 
twenty to thirty years, it has become clear that development, far from resulting from 
and hence being secondary to evolution, has a primary and determinative influence on 
evolution. Development determines what kinds of change are possible and thus fixes 
what is evolutionarily accessible and what not. Consequently, an adequate 
understanding of evolution requires that a good deal of attention be paid to 
development. This insight explains why the problem of development has become an 
independent object of inquiry in both biology and sociology in the recent past.    
 
One should not, however, allow Habermas's emphasis on the regeneration of the 
theory of socio-cultural evolution to mislead one into believing that development is 
neglected in his work. On the contrary, he is among the few contemporary authors 
who understand the need for concentrating on development while maintaining a firm 
grip on evolution rather than neglecting or even rejecting the latter in favour of the 
former. Hence he writes: 
 
Evolutionarily oriented analyses of the present...whether Marxist or non-Marxist, are forced to 
monitor their assumptions  -  assumptions that already underlie the delimitation and description of 
the object  -  on an instructive theory of social development. (1979: 126) 
 
Within the general context sketched thus far, the major theoretical question concerns 
the specific relation between development and evolution, particularly the 
developmental model determining evolutionary theoretical assumptions. It is this 




problem that, in my view, is at issue in the above-mentioned immanent critique of 
Habermas, centring on his developmental logical ontogenetic model of development.   
The main thrust of the critique, as I see it, is that his developmental model, if not in 
itself problematical, is overextended: his theory of socio-cultural evolution is a 
developmental logical one which, as such, rests on the employment of the ontogenetic 
model of development in a manner which must be regarded as involving the 
commitment of the ontogenetic fallacy.1 
  
 I.  The Starting-Point   
 
Thomas McCarthy 
While Hans-Christian Harten in the late 1970s in his studies of Jean Piaget from the 
point of view of -  but also against  -  Habermas still uncritically proceeded, in 
keeping with the latter's position, from the assumption of the theoretical desirability 
of a close articulation of ontogenesis and socio-cultural evolution (1977, 1977a), 
Thomas McCarthy at about the same time expressed his unease about the application 
of the ontogenetic model to society. Rather than concentrating on this problem, 
however, he saw fit to postpone its formulation and substantiation: 
 
The critical queries to which Habermas's conception of social evolution gives rise are legion...they 
extend to questions concerning the applicability of ontogenetic models to social systems  - the 
characterization of the infrastructure of society as a network of actions certainly does not suffice to 
justify this transposition. For various reasons (not the least of which are my own limitations), I 
shall leave the formulation and substantiation of these problems to others. (1978: 261) 
    
McCarthy, to be sure, did not leave it at that but proceeded to make a few brief yet 
pregnant suggestions which were in fact soon afterward taken up by members of the 
younger generation of critical theorists who developed them in a direction which is 
more critical of Habermas.   
 
In nuce, McCarthy's argument is that Habermas's intellectual development exhibits a 
fundamental shift in that, whereas in his earlier work he operated with a conception of 
critical theory as situation-dependent and hermeneutically rich social inquiry, in his 
later work he adopts a much more strongly theoretical programme which lays claim 
to validity independent of a historico-hermeneutic standpoint (McCarthy, 1978: 261-
271). The crucial point is now that this shift in emphasis is attributable to Habermas's 
concern with the development not only of universal or formal pragmatics but in 
particular also of the theory of socio-cultural evolution. The original conception of an 
empirical philosophy of history with practical intent made way for the theory of 
socio-cultural evolution possessing the methodological status of rational 
reconstruction. The consequences were far-reaching. The introduction of evolutionary 
theory entailed, first, the replacement of the hermeneutically situation-bound 
character of social life as basic reference point, what Habermas (1972: 389-392) for 
instance articulated as the basic experiences of modernity which accompanied the 
revolutionary origins of modern society, by the general state of development of 
humankind and, second, the weakening, if not abandonment, of the originally asserted 
unity of theory and practice. The practical meaning guiding the interpretation of 
history as well as the present was thus located not in a historically and socially 
situated practical reason but, in a Neo-Kantian turn, rather in pure practical reason. 
 




Although the issues raised by McCarthy provided a starting-point for a critical 
assessment of Habermas's position as it began to take shape in the 1970s, the actual 
elaboration of a critique of the latter's theory of socio-cultural evolution required the 
overcoming of certain difficulties in the interpretation put forward in The Critical 
Theory of Jürgen Habermas. The fact that David Held in his review and critical 
assessment of Habermas followed McCarthy so closely (1980: 281-284, 374-375) 
that he could not eliminate these difficulties explains why he failed to develop the 
critique further, despite such statements as ‘[t]he practical implications of the theory 
are undeveloped’ (1980: 376) and ‘[t]heoretical categorization is combined with an 
insufficient regard for historical analysis of evolving social relations’ (1980: 378).  At 
least three of these difficulties are worth mentioning in the present context. 
 
First, McCarthy is misled by Habermas's suggestion that a fully developed theory of 
socio-cultural evolution involves not only a reference to systematically 
reconstructible patterns of development, or a developmental logic, but also an 
explanation in terms of developmental mechanisms or dynamics of how and why 
developments actually come about, and indeed to such a degree that he overlooks the 
developmental logical emphasis Habermas lends to his theory (McCarthy, 1978: 253, 
269). In view of the fact that McCarthy not only recognizes but also questions 
Habermas's separation of abstract evolution-theoretic explanations from substantive 
narrative historiographical expositions, it is incomprehensible how he is able to 
overlook this peculiar emphasis. For the separation of evolution and history and, 
hence, developmental logic and developmental dynamics obviously entails a partial 
identification of evolution and developmental logic which eventuates in an essentially 
developmental logical evolutionary theory. 
 
Secondly, McCarthy (1978: 236) concedes to Habermas's argument that an 
evolutionary theory oriented towards the analysis of the present is compelled to 
monitor its assumptions against a guiding theory of development, but does not see 
that such acceptance by no means forces one to agree to the projection of a 
developmental logical ontogenetic model onto socio-cultural evolution. Considering 
the debate about epigenetics, particularly the position of development in relation to 
Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, in contemporary biological theory (see, e.g. 
Lovtrup, 1974; Ho and Saunders, 1979, 1982), it would seem as though Habermas's 
starting-point possesses a good deal of plausibility, but whether a theorist is entitled 
to take the further step of adopting an ontogenetic model with him is another question  
-  one that an increasing number of critics answer negatively.    
 
Finally, there is a problem about the manner in which McCarthy understands the 
relation between the theory of socio-cultural evolution and critical theory.   
According to McCarthy (1978: 265, 269-270), the theory of socio-cultural evolution 
provides the theoretical framework for a critical historical account of the genesis of 
contemporary society and its pathologies. As is clear from his treatment of 
Habermas's critical theory of late capitalism (McCarthy,1978: 358-386), he takes this 
to mean that the theory of late capitalism as for instance represented in Legitimation 
Crisis is something like an empirical appendix to a methodologically highly 
differentiated social philosophy or merely the application of a critical methodology.   
Not only does this understanding give evidence of a lack of a sufficient grasp of the 
structure of critical theory, but it also prevents McCarthy from seeing through the 
problem of the relation Habermas postulates between development and evolution as 




well as from drawing appropriate conclusions from his critique of Habermas's 
separation of evolution and history.   
 
Unlike Held, who followed McCarthy's account of Habermas's reconstruction of 
historical materialism almost verbatim and consequently failed to develop a critique 
of the resultant theory of socio-cultural evolution, Axel Honneth simultaneously 
appreciated the thrust of McCarthy's various critical points and uncovered the 
weaknesses of his interpretation (see Honneth, 1981a: 162-170). It does not come as a 
surprise, therefore, that the immanent critique of Habermas's ontogenetically based 
developmental logical theory of socio-cultural evolution received its first explicit 
formulation and substantiation in a work co-authored by Honneth (Honneth and Joas, 
1980, 1988). Here Honneth and his co-author Hans Joas had the opportunity to also 
draw on the acute analysis of Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism by 
Johann Arnason (1979, 1980). 
 
Johann Arnason 
In his analysis, which has been designed to highlight the differences between 
Habermas's reconstructed version of historical materialism and Marx's original 
model, Arnason does not make any mention of the ontogenetic model of development 
as such, yet displays a clear understanding of Habermas's relationship to the Piaget-
Kohlberg tradition of cognitive psychology (Arnason, 1979: 216) and the 
consequences the adoption of the concept of developmental logic has for the theory of 
socio-cultural evolution (1979: 211-18).    
 
Approaching Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism in a much more 
analytical spirit than McCarthy, he immediately sees that Habermas's theory of socio-
cultural evolution is a developmental logical theory which takes evolution to mean 
‘the realization of an ordered sequence of structural possibilities’ (Arnason, 1979: 
215) and appreciates that this process is regarded as taking place, analogous to ego 
development, at a number of dimensions, namely worldviews, collective identity and, 
most important for Habermas, moral-legal structures. At the same time, however, he 
also puts his finger on the basic influence cognitive psychology has had on 
Habermas's position. This influence, needless to say, goes back to the concept of 
ontogenesis as a constructive learning process undergone by a subject who develops 
from stage to stage through confrontation with and solution of objectively given 
problems. Arnason finds it exhibited by Habermas's assumption, first, of ‘a certain 
primacy of the individual over society, and hence a priority of the relationship 
between man and world compared to that between man and society’ (1979: 216), and, 
second, of systems problems bearing on moral-practical development in such a way 
that the emphasis is placed on ‘the independence and universality of the social 
process’ as such (1979: 212).    
 
The theoretical implications Arnason discovered Habermas's position to have are both 
wide-ranging and far-reaching. First, the conception of the social process as being 
grounded in a universal developmental logic of evolution circumscribes class 
struggles and social movements to such a degree that the possible historical effects of 
their practical projects are reduced to auxiliary functions of transmission and 
acceleration (1979: 213). Second, the dualistic model of the evolutionary process as 
an invariable correlation of system problems and logic of stages of maturation not 
only a priori excludes the discontinuous moment of evolutionary transitions which 




can be grasped only when attention is paid to the interlocking of the appropriation of 
nature and the association of people within a specific historical configuration (1979: 
212-3), but by the same token also portrays ‘the cumulative development of technical 
knowledge [as] the only possible modification of the relationship between man and 
nature’ (1979: 217). Finally, the introduction of the concept of development logic 
implies ‘a double closure’ (1979: 217) in that it, through an instrumentalist reduction 
of the relation between man and nature and a normativistic subsumption of the 
relations between people in society, allows neither interference from the material 
context nor alternative projects. 
 
These pernicious implications of Habermas's reconstructed version of historical 
materialism lead Arnason to suggest the introduction of an alternative praxis 
theoretical position which operates with the conception of a ‘pluri-dimensional and 
open-textured’ (1979: 217) social process involving both a more than merely 
instrumental or purposive-rational notion of the appropriation of nature and a notion 
of association admitting of alternative practical projects. 
 
With the various suggestions and arguments put forward by McCarthy and Arnason, 
the agenda was set for the articulation and elaboration of the major motifs of the 
immanent critique of Habermas's theory of socio-cultural evolution.      
  
II. The Critique        
 
Axel Honneth and Hans Joas                           
While Harten and McCarthy in the late 1970s accepted Habermas's postulation of a 
relation between ontogenesis and socio-cultural evolution, the former happily and the 
latter somewhat uneasily, and while Arnason without pinpointing the ontogenetic 
model indicated various problems in Habermas's developmental logical theory, Axel 
Honneth and Hans Joas as early as 1980 identified the basic difficulty of Habermas's 
theory of socio-cultural evolution as residing precisely in his theoretical strategy of 
basing the theory of socio-cultural evolution squarely on the ontogenetic model. 
 
Whereas McCarthy permitted himself to be led astray by Habermas's suggestion that 
a complete evolutionary theory requires a reference to both developmental logic and 
developmental dynamics, thus rendering himself incapable of assuming a critical 
posture, Honneth and Joas (1980, 1988), like Arnason, from the start appreciated the 
specific character of Habermas's theory. In a brief yet penetrating analysis they 
clarified the role of the ontogenetic model in Habermas's conceptualization of the 
theory of socio-cultural evolution, revealed the developmental logical bias of the 
theory, and demonstrated the problematic nature of its implications. Central to their 
critical analysis is a dissection of Habermas's explanation of socio-cultural evolution 
in terms of developmental logic. For thereby Honneth and Joas are able to show that 
the ontogenetic model features in Habermas's theory not only in the sense that the 
development of worldviews, collective identities and moral-legal structures are 
conceived as being analogous to ego development, but also and in particular that his 
evolutionary explanation as such depends on the attempt to ‘project the structure of 
ontogenetic learning processes on to the process of evolutionary learning’ (1988: 
165). This means that not only socially mediated technical and moral learning 
processes follow the same pattern as the process whereby the individual subject learns 
from dealing with and solving problems, but also that society as a whole in its 




evolutionary advances from the primitive to the civilizational level or from archaic 
and developed civilizations to modernity. Evolutionary learning processes in this 
latter sense involve, strictly in keeping with Habermas's ontogenetic model, 
‘unresolved system problems that represent challenges’ and ‘new levels of learning’ 
that are latently available and could be drawn upon for the purposes of solving 
problems threatening the continued existence of society as a whole (Habermas, 1979: 
121-2). For Honneth and Joas (1988: 163) this position implies that ‘system-
threatening problems’ are adduced ‘in order to identify the moral learning process 
which ... permits the overcoming of the threat to the system and thereby the 
evolutionary further development of the technical-strategic system of action. The 
manifold implications of this developmental logical ontogenetic type of evolutionary 
explanation are patiently teased out by Honneth and Joas.  
 
In the first place, an explanation that is cast in this mould necessarily abstracts from 
historically specific events and unique collective experiences within the framework of 
which social groups engage in historical action, and thus detaches itself from the real 
historical process (Honneth and Joas, 1988: 164). Insofar as such an explanation does 
take the historical context into account, it does so only to ascertain formal levels of 
consciousness and hence ignores processes of communication guided by collective 
processes of interpretation and experience gained through collective learning 
processes. That this is indeed the line followed by the developmental logical 
evolutionary explanation is borne out, for Honneth and Joas (1988: 164), by 
Habermas's rigorous separation of reconstructive developmental logic from narrative 
historiography. The theory of socio-cultural evolution is solely concerned with the 
development of structures and hence reads the historical material exclusively from the 
point of view of the logic of such development. The researcher is thus from the outset 
predestined to lose sight of the kind of historically innovative action which is 
typically represented by social movements and which does not arise in response to a 
problem threatening society as a social system. 
 
Second, the ontogenetically based developmental logical approach to socio-cultural 
evolution operates with an ambiguous concept of ‘social learning’ (Honneth and Joas, 
1988: 165-6). Habermas himself explicitly includes under that rubric systemic 
learning in the sense of the evolutionarily significant response of society as a social 
system to a system-threatening problem. As is suggested by historical evidence, 
however, moral-practical learning processes often occur within the context of social 
movements, the typical ‘historical bearers of evolutionary learning processes’ (1988: 
165). The crucial point is now that social movements, typically representing a 
consciousness of action orientations which are socially superior and constituting a 
normative advance, learn not in reaction to unresolved system problems and dangers, 
but rather through the collective experiencing of and cooperative opposition to 
repression and social justice prevailing in a society (1988: 166). Given that this is the 
case, Honneth and Joas (1988: 165) insist that Habermas is compelled at all points 
where he wants to document historically the presence of moral learning to have 
recourse to social movements which, ironically, are incompatible with developmental 
logical evolutionary classifications. Habermas (1981: 468; 1987a: 316) indeed 
envisages as ‘the major task’ that remains after the developmental logical explanatory 
scheme had been established ‘the description of evolutionary learning advances in 
terms of social movements and political transformations’. This position provides 
evidence for Honneth and Joas's (1988: 166) claim that Habermas's concept of social 




learning must of necessity be ambiguous to encompass within a single framework 
both the process of systemic learning and socially revolutionary learning processes. 
 
The final implication Honneth and Joas discover in Habermas's introduction of the 
ontogenetic model into evolutionary theory links up with the theory's high degree of 
abstraction from everyday plexuses of meaning that renders it incapable of 
vindicating the critical theoretical claim of being concerned with the development of 
enlightening hermeneutic interpretations which have a bearing on social agents' self-
understanding and help them in orienting their action. This implication, one that 
McCarthy failed to see, is that the developmental logically conceived theory of socio-
cultural evolution does not understand itself, as it should, as a reflexive step in 
substantive socio-cultural research which is by no means practically irrelevant, but 
rather ‘pretend[s] to the status of a foundational science’ (Honneth and Joas, 1988: 
166).               
  
Both Honneth and Joas, each in his own way, followed up their critique in subsequent 
writings, and while they did not contribute much towards a further understanding of 
socio-cultural evolution, they nevertheless succeeded in bringing some clarity to a 
number of related points. On the basis of a critique of both Habermas's action theory 
and his adoption of functionalist systems theory, Joas (1986: 165-6) invoked the need 
to recognize social order as being explicable only in terms of a theory of collective 
action. Following a series of essays (Honneth, 1981b, 1982), reviews (1981a, 1983) 
and papers (1985/1986) in which he insisted on the centrality of social movements 
and their collective experience of injustice, Honneth developed a comprehensive 
analysis in a book in which he presents a ‘critique of power’ (Honneth, 1985) that 
contrasts sharply with Habermas's conception which in turn eventuates in a ‘critique 
of functionalist reason’ (Habermas 1981, 1987a: subtitle). 
                              
According to Honneth, Habermas conceives of the theory of evolution as being a 
complementary extension of universal pragmatics in the sense that, whereas the latter 
focuses on the reconstruction of the implicit rule systems of social action on the 
synchronic axis, the former seeks to reconstruct the logic of development of such rule 
systems on the diachronic axis, involving the determination of the necessary sequence 
of stages in the acquisition and establishment of rule systems under the empirical 
conditions of the history of the human species (Honneth, 1985: 311-2). The crucial 
point - and this accords with Honneth and Joas's original insight - is now that 
Habermas, for the purposes of constructing his theory of evolution, made the 
important decision to transfer the logic of development Piaget had established for 
ontogenesis to the phylogenetic dimension of human history (Honneth, 1985: 311).   
As the concept of developmental logic is but one term of a conceptual pair, this 
decision entails the adoption also of the second, namely developmental dynamics.  
But since Habermas interprets this essentially psychological distinction social 
theoretically to mean that the logical dimension of the sequence of necessary stages 
of the rationality of action, worked up into a classification scheme, enjoys priority 
over the dynamic dimension of the factual process of social change, which at most 
possesses only narrative historiographical significance, he by the same token loses his 
grip on history, the dialectic of class antagonisms, social movements, and the 
communication theoretical model of ‘social order as an institutionally mediated 
communicative relation of culturally integrated groups which unfolds in the medium 




of conflict for as long as social power is asymmetrically distributed’ (Honneth, 1985: 
334). 
  
Honneth develops this by now familiar argument, although not particularly 
systematically, on two distinct levels. At the cultural level, first, he identifies over and 
above the reproduction of shared background knowledge, presumably by ontogenetic 
learning processes, collective learning processes whereby life-worldly knowledge is 
expanded and changed. It is to this latter aspect that Habermas refers as the 
‘rationalization of the lifeworld’, conceiving of it as following the same logic as that 
postulated by Piaget for ontogenesis (Honneth, 1985: 318-9). Second, for the various 
rationalized aspects of the lifeworld to become effective at the social level, they must 
in some way or another become part of social institutions and thus obtain obligatory 
validity. Decisive at this juncture, as Honneth (1985: 320) points out, is the model 
that is adopted to make sense of the implied translation of culturally rationalized 
structures of consciousness into institutional structures. Habermas's solution to this 
problem, borrowed from Weber, takes the form of a process of institutionalization in 
the course of which rationality dimensions are first differentiated into separate action 
domains at cultural level and only in the second instance do they have a trans- 
formative impact on social institutions; or as Honneth (1985: 320) puts it:  ‘the 
cognitive rationalizations are responsible for the emergence of institutional 
complexes’. Here we touch the core of Habermas's theory of evolution: the evolution 
of society is possible only if the necessary institutional preconditions within the life-
world have been established by the rationalization of communicative action and 
hence advances in forms of communication (Honneth, 1985: 325). If one bears in 
mind at this stage Honneth's basic thesis of Habermas's projection of the 
ontogenetically based concept of developmental logic onto the process of socio-
cultural evolution, then a number of considerations assume great importance. It is not 
only ontogenetic and, parallel to it, collective learning processes at the cultural level 
that follow a three-stage logic of development, but at the same time also the process 
of institutionalization at the core of socio-cultural evolution. It is in this latter respect 
that Habermas represents a theory of evolution which, as Honneth (1985: 311) 
submits, ‘investigates the development of societies with reference to its general 
logic’. 
       
As I have already pointed out, Honneth objects to the concept of social evolution in 
this sense of the general logic of the development of societies due to the fact that it 
entails a historically insensitive abstract classification. Now even if one accepts this 
position, which I think one should, a question still remains, namely: what exactly are 
the theoretical implications of a critique of the theory of socio-cultural evolution to 
the effect that its construction depends on an unjustifiable projection of the theory of 
developmental logic onto it? Honneth does not elaborate on these implications, but, 
like such authors as Alain Touraine (1981: 14) and Anthony Giddens (1984: 239), 
apparently rejects the theory of social evolution in favour of a version of the praxis 
theoretical position. 
                     
Günter Frankenberg and Ulrich Rödel 
Problems similar to those identified by Arnason and Honneth and Joas in the 
theoretical context were discovered by Günter Frankenberg and Ulrich Rödel in the 
course of substantive research within the framework of a project concerning the  
development of structures of justification and conceptions of justice in modern law as 




a sociological problem conducted under Habermas's direction during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s at the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, and reported in their book 
Von der Volkssouveränität zum Minderheitenschutz (1981: 9-31). They speak of the 
‘empirical failure of the developmental logical conception’ and even of ‘a general 
scepticism against the fruitfulness of developmental theories of the Piagetian type’ for 
the analysis of the history of society (Frankenberg and Rödel, 1981: 18). 
  
The basis of their research was a project designed by Klaus Eder, Frankenberg, Rödel 
and Ernst Tugendhat which combined a normative theory with a historical-
sociological approach. The normative theoretical component, a moral philosophical 
construct, took the form of an ontogenetically based developmental logical stage 
model, representing a reconstruction of increasingly complex justificatory structures 
at the level of philosophical ethical theories (e.g. Hobbes, Kant, Rawls, Habermas and 
Apel) (Frankenberg and Rödel, 1981: 10-15). Hypotheses deriving from a historical-
sociological theory were then related to this strong theoretical component on the 
assumption that historical developments correspond to the developmental logic. As 
regards the question of the transition to a more complex procedure of justification, the 
hypothesis was introduced that, rather than taking place through mere thought or the 
immanent development of structures, it can empirically be determined with reference 
to experiences undergone in relation to changes in social reality which are translated 
into normative pressure by political organisations and social movements (1981: 15).   
The developmental logical scheme, however, was not taken as implying causal 
necessity in the sense of history being a progression or ‘world-growth story’ (Gellner 
cited by Giddens 1984: 237), but only as representing a certain conceptual necessity 
which makes it possible to derive a criterion for distinguishing between progressive 
and regressive changes (Frankenberg and Rödel, 1981: 16).    
 
Frankenberg and Rödel's attempt to apply this twofold (moral philosophical-historical 
sociological) theoretical construct to the relevant historical material, including 
selected doctrines of British common law and in particular legislation, judgments and 
political journalism bearing on the development of the freedom of political 
communication in the USA since the colonial period, proved to be an empirical 
failure, however, in that the material simply did not admit of being ordered according 
to the chosen viewpoint. In addition, a number of weaknesses of the developmental 
logical model also became apparent. First, development is not reconstructed from the 
internal perspective of historical subjects and their normative evaluations but rather 
ex post from the perspective of the external observer according to a normative 
standard he commands by virtue of his disposal over a stage model. This standard has 
not been established by way of an analysis of historical development but a priori and 
deductively derived from a developmental logical conception which clandestinely 
regards the contemporary normative position as the endpoint of development and 
adopts it as the basis of the ex post evaluation (Frankenberg and Rödel, 1981: 19-20).   
Second, the developmental model, due to its emphasis on the co-ordination of 
evolutionary mechanisms from the point of view of the observer, leads to a reductive 
treatment of the complex of relations among normatively oriented historical actors 
and their internal perspective, institutionalized norms and system problems (1981: 
20). And, finally, the model overburdens the empirical analysis with such strong 
theoretical presuppositions that important aspects of reality are necessarily excluded 
from the observer, brushed aside as theoretically insignificant, or admitted only in 
some reduced form (1981: 20). 




   
It is significant that the empirical flaws in the developmental logical model do not 
lead Frankenberg and Rödel in the direction of a revision of a theoretical revision, 
rather it points them to a scepticism towards developmental theories of the Piagetian 
type. It is necessary, however, to be precise about the object of this scepticism for 
developmental assumptions are not thrown out in toto (1981: 20-21). The 
characteristic feature of the Piagetian type of theory for Frankenberg and Rödel, as 
for Honneth and Joas, obviously resides in its ontogenetic foundation as this is 
reflected in the twofold emphasis on the pressure of a socio-economic system 
problem and collective disposition over a stage specific argumentative competence 
which is drawn upon for the purposes of overcoming the problem (1981: 18). What is 
questionable about the ontogenetic model from their point of view is whether it is 
meaningful at all to project its developmental logical structure onto society in general.   
For the application of the ontogenetic model at this level presupposes  
 
‘that societies, social groups or classes in a particular historical period  -  comparable to children at a 
particular stage of their cognitive development  -  are not yet able to understand and to produce 
arguments and justifications with reference to moral and legal norms’ (1981: 18). 
 
This presupposition is clearly one that cannot be defended, particularly when it is 
seen in conjunction with the acceptance of the contemporary normative position as 
the endpoint of development.      
 
Johann Arnason 
What Honneth has done by way of a critique of Habermas with reference to power, 
Johann Arnason (1988) seeks to do with reference to culture and the problem of 
interpretation. While his critique thus applies more directly to Habermas's universal 
pragmatics than to his theory of evolution, the latter issue comes up time and again 
due to the fact, as Honneth made clear, that the two theoretical components are 
complementary to one another. Arnason's argument is basically that Habermas's 
universal pragmatic communications theoretical model, emphasizing consensual 
principles and obligatory action orientations, is by no means the only conceivable 
one, and certainly not one that can conclusively put to rest the conflict of 
interpretations which in modern society typically results in competing socio-cultural 
projects, such as the mastery of nature, democracy, autonomy, a national collective 
identity and revolution, which nevertheless share interpretative horizons. The 
interesting part of Arnason's analysis is the close attention he pays to the centrepiece 
of the theory of communicative action which mediates between universal pragmatics 
and the theory of evolution in that it relates the intuitive knowledge of competent 
members of society and epochally valid criteria, namely the theory of forms of 
understanding (Arnason, 1988: 187ff). 
 
According to Arnason's interpretation, Habermas's position harbours a difficulty in 
that it entails the narrowing down of a fruitful perspective no sooner than it has been 
opened up. On the one hand, Habermas bases his theoretical programme on the dual 
premise of the structures of the modern understanding of the world or form of 
interpretation and the social relations or form of life on the assumption that they are 
mutually dependent and interrelated.  Insofar as he assumes this point of view, 
Habermas recognizes the significance and autonomy of practical reason (Arnason, 
1988: 266). It is not only that consistently rationalized structures of consciousness do 
not admit of being belatedly transposed into appropriate communicative structures but 




rather can be developed at all only in conjunction with such structures; it is also that 
the relation between the culturally codified worldview and the historical process of 
the change of society exhibits tensions and deficits which require a practical critique 
and transformation of society. 
       
Although Habermas thus approaches a complex concept of practical reason which 
applies not only to what one may call developmental collective learning processes 
running parallel to ontogenesis, but also to the evolution of the practically rational 
organization of society by way of evolutionary collective learning processes, Arnason 
nevertheless finds that he, on the other hand, interprets modern structures of 
consciousness in a transcendental manner: they play precisely the same role in 
relation to the theory of communicative action as do the natural sciences in relation to 
Kant's critique of reason (1988: 267). This implies that practical reason is transposed 
into something a priori and located outside society as the standard and goal of social 
evolution. It is from this point of view that Habermas in The Theory of 
Communicative Action (1987a) conceives of evolution as the evolution of forms of 
understanding (Arnason, 1988: 239, 269), within the context of which the modern 
form enjoys a privileged position. Arnason's interpretation is supported, incidentally, 
by Honneth and Joas (1988: 167) who point out that in Habermas's last major work 
‘the theory of socio-cultural evolution has been left only with the function of serving 
as a kind of secondary theoretical affirmation of the process of the evolution of 
consciousness...’ It is almost as though Habermas is on the verge of transposing 
practical reason into pure reason and of joining the ranks of the evolutionary 
epistemologists. 
       
Whereas Habermas adopts his peculiar evolutionary theoretic position in order to 
avoid the unacceptable consequences of cultural relativism, Arnason, against the 
above background, comes to the significant conclusion that, if the possibility of the 
‘immanent self-critique’ of modern society opened up by the full concept of practical 
reason is taken seriously, then the ‘radical self-relativization of modernity’ is as little 
a danger as the legitimation of the self-understanding of modernity by way of ‘an 
epoch-transcendent theory of society and history’ is a viable option (Arnason, 1988: 
267). From this it would seem as though Arnason, unlike Honneth, would be willing 
to contemplate retaining the theory of evolution, yet in the form not of a universal 
historical and general societal theory but specifically of a theory of social evolution in 
that it focuses on the evolution of the rationality of those social practices which are 
decisive for the organization of society. A praxis theoretical position is introduced 
which seeks to avoid the reductionism of the praxis tradition at least in this respect, 
namely retaining the theory of social evolution. 
  
Klaus Eder  
What remains implicit in Arnason is made into an explicit theme by Klaus Eder in his 
latest work. Like Arnason, he adopts a theory of praxis, but at the same time he also 
develops a theory of evolution which, correspondingly, takes the form of a theory of 
the social evolution of practical reason (Eder, 1988). Considering Eder's position as a 
whole, however, it is remarkable that it has undergone a drastic change in the course 
of the last twelve years or so. From being Habermas's chief theoretical collaborator in 
the development of the theory of socio-cultural evolution (see Eder, 1976; Habermas, 
1979), Eder has emerged on the side of Habermas's praxis theoretical critics, but one 
who, unlike Honneth, does not reject but rather fundamentally rethinks evolutionary 




theory. This change of position has gone through a number of clearly identifiable 
phases. 
   
The first step towards distantiation from Habermas was taken in the first part of the 
1980s and culminated in his book Geschichte als Lernprozess? (Eder, 1985).   
Inspired by Max Miller's (1986) sociological learning theory to which is central the 
concept of collective learning, Eder here develops an indirect critique of Habermas's 
view, underpinning his essentially classical understanding of institutionalization 
according to which cultural rationalization calls forth corresponding institutions, that 
the rationalization of the lifeworld is spearheaded by ontogenetic learning processes.   
It consists of the demonstration that everything depends instead on social or collective 
learning processes which are located or, at least, begin at the everyday level of the 
practice of life. The principles of freedom, equality and discourse were for the first 
time clarified and socially concretized in the political associations that increasingly 
formed from the eighteenth century onwards and called forth learning processes in the 
participating individuals. Hence Eder's (1985: 87) main empirical thesis: ‘the logic of 
associative communalization underlies the rationalization process of moral 
consciousness in the modern period’. 
                                  
Although Eder's argument went to the heart of the matter, it did so only in some 
aspects in that he at this stage still uncritically accepted Habermas's linear theory of 
socio-cultural evolution. This situation changed in Die Vergesellschaftung der Natur 
(1988). Eder indeed continues criticising Habermas's obliteration of collective 
learning processes as a result of his overextension of the ontogenetic model, as he did 
earlier, as for instance where he points out that Habermas actually reverses the true 
relationship when he depicts the connection between social structure and reason as 
implying that truth leads to professions and correctness to associations (1988: 302).  
But over and above this he focuses in this work on the deformation of the theory of 
social evolution which occurs when the ontogenetic model is projected onto it. He 
thus breaks radically with Habermas's universal historical and general societal - 
which in effect means his developmental logical - theory of evolution in favour of a 
praxis-theoretically based theory of the social evolution of practical reason. Given 
that Eder collaborated with Habermas in the elaboration of the developmental logical 
theory of evolution, it is obvious that this third step required, over and above breaking 
with Habermas, a radical self-critique on his own part. To his credit, Eder (1988: 33) 
does not attempt to conceal the radical turn-about in his thinking and the need for a 
far-reaching self-critique. 
 
Eder develops a profusion of critical perspectives, both directly and indirectly, on 
Habermas's theory of socio-cultural evolution,2 but it is nevertheless possible                                             
to identify a basic theoretical strategy informing his critique of Habermas. It is best 
expressed, in my view, by the formula ‘ontogenetic fallacy’ (1988: 296, 310, 313).   
While Eder apparently draws on a different source for inspiration, namely the essays 
in Schöfthaler and Goldschmidt's reader (1984) containing a critical discussion of 
Piaget's contribution from the point of view of the question of the relation between 
social structure and reason, this formula encapsulates the early insight of Honneth and 
Joas to the effect that the projection of the developmental logical structure of the 
ontogenetic learning process onto society has theoretically profound yet undesirable 
consequences. Eder, however, works it out in a more differentiated although not 
always fully consistent manner. On the one hand, the ontogenetic fallacy consists in 




drawing a conclusion from ontogenesis in respect of the change and development of 
culture or collective symbolic systems which can be accounted for only with 
reference to supra-individual learning processes. At this level, therefore, the 
ontogenetic fallacy can be overcome by the introduction of the concept of social or 
collective learning processes (Eder, 1988: 296-8). On the other hand, the ontogenetic 
fallacy is committed when one transfers the ontogenetic model to the level of 
evolution (1988: 313). As suggested earlier, the solution of the ontogenetic fallacy at 
this level demands rather more drastic intervention. On the whole, it involves a 
radical break with the developmental logical conception of evolution as such. This he 
accomplishes in a number of steps. 
 
First, Eder displaces the psychologically inspired distinction between developmental 
logic and developmental dynamics by the theory of the self-production of society, 
borrowed from Touraine (Eder, 1988: 256-7, 301) and referred to as the theory of 
praxis (Eder, 1988: 291-3, 300). This he does in order to fill a categorial gap he 
discovers in Habermas's theory under the influence of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of 
practice, namely a gap left by Habermas's concentration on the opus operatum in the 
sense of the effects of evolutionary changes to the detriment of the modus operandi in 
the sense of evolutionary changes and their mechanisms themselves. Second, Eder 
introduces a sharp distinction between ontogenetic and collective learning on the one 
hand, and social evolution on the other, in order to break the hold developmental 
logic has over evolution in Habermas's work (1988: 303, 313, 316-7). Finally, these 
moves culminate in Eder's most drastic critical (and self-critical) step, namely 
radically freeing the theory of social evolution from the universal historical and 
general societal frame within which it is confined by Habermas, with a view to 
avoiding the untenable causal assumptions, schematizations, classifications and 
ideological implications to be found in the latter's work (Eder, 1988: 33, 69, 165, 291, 
325, 374). 
 
Although various specific difficulties can be found in Eder's proposals, something I 
will return to below, there is no doubt about the fact that he has succeeded in lending 
new impetus to the major thrust of the immanent  critique of Habermas's theory of 
socio-cultural evolution. It is equally clear that Habermas would be able to ignore the 
results of this critique only at his own peril. 
 
III. The Response 
Jürgen Habermas 
It is interesting to note that a perusal of Habermas's latest works from the point of 
view of the question of what impact the immanent critique of his theory of socio-
cultural evolution is exerting on his thinking by no means ends in disappointment.   
On the contrary, his major writings from 1985 to 1988 give unequivocal if brief 
indications of an attempt to accommodate the major points raised by his critics. 
 
In the fifth volume of his political writings entitled Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit 
Habermas (1985a: 234) acknowledges Eder's critique of his assumption that 
ontogenetic learning processes function as pacemaker of socio-cultural evolution: 
 
‘He [Eder] leads innovative spurts immediately back to social learning processes in the framework 
of new forms of association, i.e. to new experiences of egalitarian intercourse first in freemason 
lodges, secret societies and reading circles, later in the early socialist workman associations’. 
 




The concessions Habermas subsequently made to his critics in Kommunikatives 
Handeln (1986: 394) by adopting in self-criticism of his earlier position both a 
sociological theory of learning and the concept of social or collective learning 
processes, bears out the fact, however, that he did not stop at merely acknowledging 
the critique but soon after was willing to embrace it  -  although he at this stage has 
still neglected to spell out the implications of this step for his overall theoretical 
position (Strydom, 1987a). These concessions were preceded by an affirmative use of 
the concept of learning processes in Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne 
(Habermas, 1985a: 394; 1987c: 339). The employment of the concept in this context, 
it is interesting to note, went together with the introduction of a new position on the 
aesthetic or conative component of culture: instead of an expressionist theory of art 
he now forwarded a Heideggerian-like theory of world disclosure.    
 
It is remarkable that in subsequent writings collected in Eine Art Schadensabwicklung 
(1987a), for instance in ‘Die Idee der Universität – Lernprozesse’ (1987b: 76, 79, 94, 
95, 96) and ‘Geschichtsbewusstsein und posttraditionale Identität’ (1987b: 170), the 
concept of learning processes appears again and again. This same collection also 
contains a theoretically most interesting statement to the effect that ‘[i]t would be 
false to conceive of group-identities as ego-identities writ large - between them holds 
not an analogy but a complementary relationship’ (1987b: 73). The question raised by 
the position Habermas takes here is: what are the implications for the ontogenetic 
model? Does Habermas's commitment to the ontogenetic model remain unaffected, or 
does this move decrease its theoretical significance? In my view, the latter of these 
two options applies. For the severance of the analogy or homology between ego-
identity and group-identity implies a significant decrease in the range of application 
of the ontogenetic model, i.e. a withdrawal from the domain of collective identity and 
a corresponding confinement of the model to the domain of ego-identity, and a 
surrendering of the vacated domain to social or collective learning processes. 
 
If my interpretation is correct, this means that by 1987 Habermas had made a 
remarkable transition by fully absorbing the critique Eder advanced in 1985. But this 
still left the universal historical employment of the ontogenetic model intact. A 
change of position affecting this dimension of the ontogenetic fallacy would seem to 
be broached, however, in Habermas's book, Nachmetaphysisches Denken (1988). 
   
As in the preceding works, the concept of learning processes abounds in the 
philosophical essays collected in this work (1988: 50, 101-3, 103-4, 177, 178, 191).   
And in this context Habermas draws a sharp distinction between ontogenetic and 
social or collective learning processes: 
 
‘Socialization and formative processes are person dependent learning processes. From these we 
must distinguish supra-subjective learning effects which manifest themselves as cultural and social 
innovations and are sedimented in the productive forces and structures of moral consciousness’. 
(1988: 101-3). 
 
It is to this latter category of social or collective learning that he refers as 
‘intramundane learning processes’ (1987c: 339). 
 
Of greater importance in this work than the employment of the concept of learning 
processes, however, are those cautious yet far-reaching steps Habermas takes toward 
curtailing the reach of the ontogenetic model, withdrawing it from the domain of 




universal history. On the whole, these steps entail a distantiation from a Neo-Kantian, 
quasi-transcendental or criteriological position in favour of a weaker theoretical 
position. As against the ‘idea of undamaged intersubjectivity’, given with the 
necessary conditions of understanding and agreement, in the sense of the totality of a 
reconciled form of life projected as a utopia into the future, first, Habermas 
introduces the conception of self-production (‘Produzierens oder 
Selberhervorbringens’, 1988: 186) whereby human beings in a responsible yet 
unintended manner through fallible and often abortive, co-operative yet by no means 
conflict-free ventures engage in the establishment of an appropriate form of life.   
This move entails, second, the introduction of the concept of ‘situated reason’ (1988: 
186, 48, 179). And, finally, he accepts Hilary Putnam's and Thomas McCarthy's 
contention, which obviously has devastating implications for his three-stage universal 
historical and general societal theory of socio-cultural evolution, that in cases of 
intercultural and historical understanding in which both rival conceptions and 
conflicting standards of rationality come into play, the relation between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ is a symmetrical one (1988: 177). 
 
The various changes Habermas has made to his position between 1985 and 1988  -  
from the adoption of the concept of social or collective learning over and above 
person-dependent ontogenetic learning processes, through the theory of the self-
production of a form of life characterized by undamaged intersubjectivity and the 
related concept of situated practical reason, to symmetrical relations between 
intercultural and historical contexts  -  all provide evidence of the fact that he, in 
accordance with the immanent critique of his work, is discernibly freeing his theory 
of socio-cultural evolution from its entanglement in the woof and warp of the 
ontogenetic fallacy by moving away from his earlier ontogenetically based 
developmental logical conception of the theory.    
 
IV. The Outlook  
Considering the thrust of the immanent critique of Habermas's theory of socio-
cultural evolution as well as the latter's response to it, the major question that arises 
now is how the emerging new position is best further developed. 
 
To begin with, it is certain that the emerging position involves not the rejection but 
rather the retention and reconstitution of the theory of socio-cultural evolution. 
Theorists such as Alain Touraine (1981: 14) and Anthony Giddens (1984: 239) are 
mistaken, in my view, when they advocate that we should break with evolutionary 
theory in a radical way. Their common error is that they take the inflated claims of 
evolutionists at face value and hence as entailing the discrediting of the theory of 
socio-cultural evolution rather than subjecting them to a thorough critical analysis.   
Had they conducted such analysis and discovered the typical confusion of 
development and evolution and the naturalistic assumptions of the major evolutionary 
theorists, they would have realized that there is no need for rejecting evolutionary 
theory. Because of the fact that Klaus Eder sees through not only the 
configurationalist limitations of Touraine's and Giddens's respective positions (1988: 
292-5) but also the unjustifiable naturalistic assumptions of the classical theories of 
socio-cultural evolution from Spencer to Luhmann and Habermas (1988: 18, 166) and 
is therefore able to conduct a critical analysis of evolutionary theory in the social 
sciences, his latest work must serve as a major reference point in any discussion about 
the future development of the theory of socio-cultural evolution. This does not mean, 




however, that one would be able to adopt his proposals lock, stock and barrel. On the 
contrary, they display certain conceptual difficulties which would have to be 
eliminated before his work could become really fruitful for the development of an 
adequate theory of socio-cultural evolution. 
    
The first difficulty in Eder's work pertains to his proposal to appropriate the ‘theory 
of praxis’ (Eder 1988: 291, 292) in order to conceptualize the process of the 
production of society which precedes and serves as the social presupposition of both 
the rationalization of the lifeworld and systems building. It is possible to agree with 
him on the need for the introduction of a theoretical component to fill the gap left by 
macro communication and system theories, such as those of Habermas and Luhmann 
respectively, which concentrate on the opus operatum to the exclusion of the modus 
operandi (1988: 291). But, considering the inherent weaknesses and drawbacks of 
praxis philosophy (see Habermas 1982: 223-6; 1984: 25-6; 1987c: 60-9, 75-82), it is 
highly questionable whether this component should be given the form of the theory of 
praxis. The problems Eder runs into in his attempt to do so become apparent at a 
number of different levels. His emphatic appropriation of the theory of praxis and 
simultaneous insistence that it should not be understood as an action theory due to the 
fact that it concerns a social reality over and above the individual (1988: 292), does 
not help to clarify the problematic relation between the theory of praxis and the 
theory of the collective production and reproduction of the constitutive structures of 
society. In my view, the latter can only with ill effects be forced into the mould of the 
former. This is borne out by the conceptual confusion surrounding his use of the term 
‘praxis’. Rather than lifeworld or system, Eder adopts praxis as the most basic 
concept which provides the root metaphor for his overarching theory of society 
(1988: 300). No sooner has he taken this step, however, than he proposes to treat 
‘praxis’ as one of the terms of a conceptual pair, the other being ‘poiesis’ (1988: 306-
7). Both praxis and poiesis are practices through which the potentialities made avail-
able by individual and collective learning processes are realized. Whereas the latter 
leads to the expansion of knowledge and control over the environment of society, the 
former eventuates in the rationalization of the forms of communicative understanding 
and agreement. The equivocation is obvious: how could the concept of praxis be 
employed concurrently both as an overarching concept and as a term of a conceptual 
pair? A solution is obviously required which is capable of making sense both of the 
theory of the collective production and reproduction of society and of praxis as one of 
a number of social practices. I propose to return to this question in due course. 
 
A second major difficulty in Eder's proposals resides in the status accorded to the 
ontogenetic model. We have already seen that Eder, with the support of Miller, 
elaborated on the concept of collective learning processes in order to be able to 
conceive of the development and change of culture or collective symbolic systems of 
interpretation in terms other than the development of the individual. In light of this 
advance, it strikes one as most peculiar when he then nevertheless proposes to refer to 
both aspects by means of the concept of ontogenesis, thus speaking in parallel fashion 
of ‘the ontogenesis of psychic systems’ and of ‘the ontogenesis of knowledge and 
morality’ or ‘the ontogenesis of society’ (Eder 1988: 315, 316). While Eder was 
instrumental in introducing the formula of the ontogenetic fallacy for the purposes of 
criticizing the classical theories of socio-cultural evolution, including Habermas's, he 
himself, paradoxically enough, continues to commit that very fallacy insofar as he 




persists in thinking of the development and change of culture and society according to 
a model which applies strictly speaking only to the development of the individual.    
 
The solution to the problems Eder comes up against is ready to hand in his work 
although without him ever realizing it. It is encapsulated by the expression 
‘Vergesellschaftung’.3 It makes its appearance throughout Eder's work (e.g. 1988: 23, 
256, 289, 290, 291, 293, 300, 307, 308, 310, 368 as well as the title), but an 
assessment of its varied employment shows that for him it is not a concept with a 
clear meaning. In the title of his latest book as well as at crucial points in the text 
(1988: 307, 308), he takes ‘Vergesellschaftung’ to mean the human social 
appropriation or socialization of nature. As such it contrasts with the production 
(‘Herstellung’) of a social order. On another occasion, however, Eder speaks of ‘the 
socialization of nature’ and ‘the socialization of sociality’ (1988: 310) in the same 
breath as being subject to a particular cultural code. This code could take the form of 
either praxis or poiesis, the latter representing the principles of domination and 
control and the former those of co-operation, understanding and agreement. This 
usage is in line with his perception of a need for social theory to shift from an 
emphasis on social order, the opus operatum, to the ambivalent and contradictory 
process of the creation or construction, the production and reproduction of society, 
the modus operandi, and that such a dynamicization of social theory is captured by 
the concept of ‘Vergesellschaftung’ (1988: 256, 290). What I find astounding is that 
Eder neglects to pursue and develop this insight. Instead of a theory of 
‘Vergesellschaftung’, he proposes that we should adopt the theory of praxis to fulfil 
this requirement. The key concept of social theory or the theory of society, according 
to his understanding, is neither lifeworld nor system (1988: 300). The reason for this 
is that both of these concepts are not only incapable of grasping society as a 
‘phenomene social total’ (1988: 356) but in fact displace it. In order to grasp social 
reality in this sense, attention must rather be paid to the process of the collective 
production and reproduction of society. For Eder this means that the key concept is 
praxis, and that it is oriented towards the development of a constructivist macro-
theory of society. In view of the inherent limitations of the praxis perspective, 
however, I am convinced that the concept of praxis cannot assume this function and 
that if it were to be retained it would have to be integrated into a more comprehensive 
alternative. This alternative is, in my view, represented by the theory of 
‘Vergesellschaftung’, that is, the theory of socialization or of sociation in both the 
micro and macro sense of the term.4 
                                                   
It is this theory that has to be built into the theory of socio-cultural evolution were we 
not only to overcome the ontogenetic fallacy and avoid its monistic impact but also to 
develop evolutionary theory in an appropriately differentiated yet not eclectic 
manner.                  
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Commerce and Law, University College Cork; and the Commission of the European Communities in 
respect of DELTA Project 1002. This essay was completed in July 1989 and therefore does not take 
into account subsequence publications by the authors concerned. 
 
1 The critique of Habermas’s position to be reviewed below applies, in my opinion, with equal force to 
the work of his colleague, collaborator and friend, Karl-Otto Apel, particularly as represented by his 
latest publication (1988). 
2 These critical perspectives include the following arguments: 
• Habermas’s theory of socio-cultural evolution, following the classical theories, ultimately gives 
primacy to natural evolution (Eder, 1988: 18); 
• Habermas makes the question of the classification of societies the central question of the theory of 
socio-cultural evolution, while the central issue is really whether the appropriation of nature is related 
to learning processes in the dimension of practical reason (1988: 19); 
• Habermas’s view of a unilinear and unequivocal process of rationalization in modern times is 
unjustifiable in light of the fact that the modern form of the symbolic appropriation of nature is 
ambivalent (1988: 23); 
• Habermas’s theory of evolution, while correctly emphasizing morality, does not radically enough free 
evolution from natural or universal history, which implies that the location of moral evolution is much 
more subtle that he would have us believe (1988: 33, also 291); 
• Habermas’s moralization of historical materialism places the emphasis on the inner reality of society 
and as a consequence excludes nature from the theory (1988: 33-4, also 51-2) and thus becomes 
insensitive to the ecological problematic (1988: 36); 
• Habermas operates with an inadequate theory of culture in that he, over and above the rules of 
productive practices, takes account of the rules of distributive practices by way of moral 
consciousness, but thereby excludes consumptive practices (1988: 36-7); 
• Habermas’s competence theoretical conceptualization of evolution as a phenotypic manifestation or 
embodiment of genotypic characteristics betrays a biologistic tendency which leads to a concept of 
society the emergent properties of which are shifted onto the systemic dimension (1988: 290); 
• Habermas’s theory of evolution as a rationalistic theory assumes an implicit compulsion towards 
learning, but what sets it in motion and the social presuppositions of the process are not taken into 
account (1988: 290-1); 
• Habermas conceives of the theory of evolution as a structural theory of what has been learned while it 
should rather be conceived as a structural theory of the practical application of what has been learnt 
(1988: 302); 
• Habermas presents structural models of social formations whereas what is required for the theory of 
evolution are structural models of praxis (1988: 309); 
• Habermas’s theory of evolution, emphasizing understanding and co-operation, is not a theory of 
historical evolutionary processes but a normative theory, a utopian counter-model of modernity (1988: 
308); 
• Habermas operates with an affirmative concept of evolution (1988: 309); 
• Habermas seeks to resolve the directional problem in evolution by recourse to developmental logic, 
but this constitutes nothing less than the ontogenetic fallacy (1988: 310); 
• Habermas constructs ideal stages of evolution rather than identifying real stages (1988: 320); 
• Habermas tries to gauge practical reason and its evolution from ethical systems, but this is possible 
only with reference to social praxis in which moralization labour is done, as represented by cultural, 
political and social movements (1988: 372-3); 
• to the extent that Habermas holds to the conception of moral evolution as culminating in modernity, 
he entertains an evolution theoretic myth, indeed an ideology which should not be mistaken for a 
counterfactual one (1988: 373); 
• Habermas makes the correct assumptions about moral learning but applies them incorrectly: the 
stages of development do not culminate in modernity but can be identified in all societies (1988: 375); 
and finally 
• Habermas assumes too close a relationship between learning and evolution (1988: 376). 
3 The expression Vergesellschaftung runs from such classical authors as Karl Marx, Max Weber and 
Georg Simmel through early twentieth-century writers such as Georg Lukács and Theodor Adorno 
down to contemporary social theorists like Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe. It indeed makes its 
appearance in the English-language literature, yet in such a range of confusing translations that the 
formation of an awareness of Vergesellschaftung as the key concept of social theory was inhibited. 
Among these translations are the following: socialization (in both the English-language academic 




                                                                                                                                           
sociological and the Marxist sense), societalization, sociation, consociation, appropriation, adaptation 
and integration. I provided a preliminary overview in Strydom, 1987a. 
4 For several years now I have been engaged in developing a theoretical position which I propose to 
refer to as ‘the theory of sociation’. I have arrived at this position by setting myself off, on the one 
hand, from Habermas’s synchronic-structuralist theory of communicative action and, on the other, 
from the opposed theory of praxis of his explicit (e.g. Axel Honneth and Klaus Eder) and implicit 
critics (e.g. Alain Touraine and Pierre Bourdieu) critics. In strategic respects, it differs also sharply 
from Anthony Giddens’s rather abstractly named ‘theory of structuration’. 
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